寄生草莓的英文俱樂部

原文網址： Erdogan’s new sultanate

SEEN IN silhouette(剪影) from a commuter ferry(通勤渡船) bustling(熙熙攘攘) across the Bosporus, parts of Istanbul seem to have changed little from centuries past. Looking to the west, towards Europe, the old walled city is still capped by multiple domes and spiky minarets(光塔). But turn to the east, towards Asia, and a different picture unfolds.

看到通勤渡船穿過博斯普魯斯海峽繁華剪影，伊斯坦堡的某些部分在過去幾個世紀的變化似乎不大。向西看去，走向歐洲，被老城牆包圍的城市仍然充滿了圓頂和尖塔；但轉向東方，走向亞洲，不同的畫面展開。

Standing as sentries(哨兵) to the narrow strait, giant gantry(構台) cranes heave(舉起) containers(貨櫃) onto waiting ships. Beyond them, along the low-slung Marmara shore, march soaring ranks of high-rise buildings. To the north, the hills on the Asian side of the Bosporus prickle with a metallic forest of communications towers(通信塔). And on the highest of those hills rises a startling(怵目驚心的) mirror to the old Istanbul: the giant bulbous(球根的) dome(圓屋頂) and six rocket-like minarets(光塔) of a colossal(巨大的) new mosque (pictured). When finished later this year, this will be Turkey’s biggest-ever house of prayer.

望向狹窄普魯斯海峽，巨大的門式起重機將貨櫃運上等待的船隻。越過他們，沿著低矮的馬爾馬拉海岸，高高聳立著直入雲霄的大樓。往北部，在博斯普魯斯海峽的東側的山上，金屬叢林般的通信塔如荊棘般林立。在最高的山頭站立著象徵著舊時伊斯坦堡的巨型穹頂，以及新的清真寺的六個火箭形狀的尖塔。在今年完工後，這將是土耳其有史以來最大的祈禱院。

The scale and symbolism of the mosque, like so much of the frenzied(發狂的) construction that is reshaping this city, reflect the will and vision of one man: Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After over two decades in power, from 1994 as mayor of Istanbul, from 2003 as Turkey’s prime minister and since August 2014 as president, Mr Erdogan towers over his country’s political landscape. To detractors(詆毀者) he is a would-be sultan, implacable(不能改變的), cunning(狡猾的) and reckless(魯莽的) in his ambition. To admirers he is the embodiment(化身) of a revived(再生的) national spirit, a man of the people elevated to worldly(世俗的) glory, a pugnacious(好鬥的) righter(改正者) of wrongs and a bold defender of the faith.

這棟清真寺的規模和象徵，就如同重塑這個城市的其他瘋狂建設一樣，反映了一個人的意志和遠見：雷傑普·塔伊普·埃爾多安。經過二十多年來的掌權，從1994年的伊斯坦堡市長，2003年成為土耳其的總理，自2014年8月出任總統，埃爾多安先生猶如巨塔般，成為土耳其的政治景觀。對於詆毀他的人而言，他是一個想成為蘇丹的人，在他的野心之下，他無情、狡詐、而魯莽。對崇拜者而言，他是復生的民族精神的化身，一個將民族提升到到世俗榮耀之中的人，一個好鬥的錯誤改正者，和一個大膽的信仰捍衛者。

Mr Erdogan has presided over some startling transformations. In two short decades his country, and most dramatically its long-neglected Anatolian hinterland(腹地；內地), has moved from relative poverty and provincialism(地方主義；地區性) to relative wealth and sophistication(精明). An inward-looking(內向的；封閉的) nation that exported little except labour has become a regional economic powerhouse(區域經濟強國), a tourist magnet as well as a haven(避難所) for refugees, and an increasingly important global hub (樞紐) for energy, trade and transport.

埃爾多安先生主導了一些驚人的轉變。在短短二十年間，他的國家，尤其是長久受到忽視的安納托利亞內陸，從相對貧困和鄉土的轉變為相對富有和精明。一個原本封閉的只輸出勞動力的國家，轉身一變成為區域經濟強國，一個旅遊熱點，和難民的避難所，並成為全球能源，貿易和運輸的樞紐。

In many ways Turkey’s 78m people have never had it so good. Since the 1990s the proportion of those living below the official poverty line has declined from the teens to low single digits, and the share of the middle class has doubled to over 40%. By every measure of living standards, the gap between Turkey and fellow members of the OECD, a club of mostly rich countries, has shrunk markedly.

在許多方面，土耳其的7800萬人民從來沒有這麼好過，90年代那些生活在貧困線以下的人口比例已經從兩位數下降到個位數，中產階級的比例翻倍達到40％以上。用任何一種生活衡量指數來看，土耳其和最富裕國家俱樂部的經合組織中其他成員國之間的差距已明顯縮小。

Under the subtle but relentless(不屈不撓的) Islamising influence of the Justice and Development (AK) party, co-founded and led by Mr Erdogan until he became the nation’s (theoretically non-partisan) president, the Sunni Muslim component of Turkey’s complex national identity(身份) has strengthened. The long shadow of Kemal Ataturk, the ruthless(冷酷無情的) moderniser(現代化主義者) who 90 years ago built a secular(世俗的) republic on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, has faded. The AK party has marched the army, long given to ejecting elected governments from power, back to its barracks(兵營). Turkey has resumed(恢復職位) its role as turntable(轉盤) between east and west.

在埃爾多安的領導與正義與發展黨（AK）微妙而不懈的影響力下，一直到埃爾多安成為國家的（理論上的無黨派）主席，似乎更為強化了土耳其複雜的國家認同的遜尼派身份。冷酷無情的現代化主義者凱末爾，九十年前在奧斯曼帝國的廢墟上所建立的世俗共和國的長長的影子已經漸漸淡去。AK黨已經將長期拒絕將大權交給民選政府的大軍班師回到軍營，土耳其已恢復了其作為東部和西部之間的樞紐角色。

When the AK party stumbled badly in parliamentary elections in June 2015, pundits(評論家) were quick to herald(預示；歡呼) an end to Mr Erdogan’s long winning streak(時期). Whiffs(難聞的氣味) of corruption and abuse of power had tainted(汙染) his party, and terrorist acts by Islamic State (IS) and the influx of more than 2m Syrian refugees into the country had made Turks question his judgment.

當AK黨在 2015 年 6 月的議會選舉中失足，專家們很快的預言埃爾多安連勝紀錄的結束。腐敗和濫權的腐臭氣息汙染了他的政黨，伊斯蘭國（IS）的恐怖份子和超過200萬進入土耳其的敘利亞難民使得土耳其人質疑他的判斷。

Who dares, wins  誰敢做，誰就是贏家

Shorn of a parliamentary majority for the first time since 2002, the AK party should have sought a coalition partner, but instead Mr Erdogan boldly gambled on a new election on November 1st. To everyone’s astonishment his party surged back, trouncing(使大敗) a trio(三重奏) of rival parties. With 317 seats in the Grand National Assembly, Turkey’s unicameral(單院制) 550-seat parliament, the party can now again legislate at will.

自2002年以來首次被剝奪了議會多數黨的角色，AK黨本應尋求聯盟夥伴，然而埃爾多安卻大膽地賭上11月1日舉行的選舉，讓人驚訝的是，他的政黨支持度飆升回來，痛擊對手的三重唱，在 550 席的單院制的國民議會中取得了 317 席，這個政黨又掌握了立法權了。

However, its majority is insufficient to allow it to revise Turkey’s 1982 constitution on its own. That was what Mr Erdogan had been trying to achieve in the June election, in the hope of creating a presidential system that would greatly widen his ostensibly(表面上) limited (but in fact extensive) powers as president. In the absence of a two-thirds majority, he must work in tandem(協力地) with his hand-picked prime minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, who is a less divisive(製造分裂的) figure.

然而，即使贏得了國會多數席次並不足以讓他們獨力修改土耳其 1982 年以來的憲法，這是埃爾多安安一直試圖在6月大選中實現的，目的在創造總統制，這將大大拓展他表面上有限（但實際上相當廣闊的）總統權力。在缺乏三分之二多數的狀況下，他必須與他欽點的總理艾哈邁德達武特奧盧齊心協力，後者是一個比較不會製造分裂的人物。

Ahead of the November election Mr Erdogan wisely toned down(使溫和) rhetoric(花言巧語) about expanding his own powers but quietly strengthened his control over the party. At a party meeting last September he engineered the replacement of 31 members (out of 50) of the party’s politburo(政治局) with people personally loyal to him. One of these, his son-in law, is now also a cabinet minister; and one of the party’s new members of parliament is Mr Erdogan’s former chauffeur(司機).

在11月大選之前，埃爾多安很明智地淡化關於擴張自己權力的言詞，只是默默地加強他對黨內的控制。在去年九月的黨會議中，他技巧的把黨政治局中 50 人中的 31 名用忠於自己的人取代，其中的一個是他的女婿，也是現任的內閣部長。而黨議會的新成員之一則是埃爾多安的前司機。

Today there is no doubt about who is boss. Bureaucrats in Ankara, the capital, respond to the merest whisper from the saray (palace), the grandiose(壯闊的；沾沾自喜的) 1,000-room presidential complex, built atop a hill on the city’s outskirts(近郊) at a reported cost of $615m and opened in 2014. The famously short-fused(暴躁易怒的) Mr Erdogan will almost certainly continue to dominate Turkish politics until the end of his term in 2019, and very possibly beyond: some say he has set his sights on 2023, the 100th anniversary of the Turkish republic. By then he would have served at the helm(掌舵) of the Turkish state for far longer than Ataturk himself.

毫無疑問的，所有的人都知道誰是老闆。首都安卡拉的官僚們回應著來自薩拉伊（宮殿）耳語，這個件在城市近郊小山頂上的宮殿有宏偉的1000間客房，花費了6 億美元，並在2014年開放使用。暴躁易怒的埃爾多安幾乎確定會繼續主宰土耳其的政治直到 2019 年他任期結束，而且很有可能會更久，有人說他已經把目光放在 土耳其共和國成立 100 週年的2023年。在那之前，他將是比阿塔圖爾克在位還久的土耳其的掌舵人。

To his party’s pious(虔誠的) core constituency(選民；支持者), that is something to rejoice in. Much of the country’s urban working class, as well as those living in the stretch of central Anatolia sometimes known as Turkey’s Koran belt, share this cult-like(類似邪教) devotion to the former food vendor and semi-professional footballer turned statesman. Other AK voters, such as small businessmen and property developers(房地產開發商), may be warier(謹慎的) of Mr Erdogan. They support the party mainly because of its record of economic growth and relative stability after decades of turbulence. The AK’s swift comeback between the June and November polls reflected fear of a return to political volatility(反覆無常) as much as enthusiasm(熱情) for its policies.

對 AK 黨的虔誠核心選民而言，那是值得歡欣鼓舞的。土耳其大部分的城市工人階級，以及那些生活在安納托利亞中部被稱為土耳其的古蘭經區域的居民，對這個前食品供應商和半職業足球運動員轉變成的政治家，展現著有如邪教般的虔誠。其他AK選民，如小商人和房地產開發商，則對埃爾多安表示謹慎，他們對這個黨的擁護，主要是因為他們在數十年動盪之後使得經濟增長和相對穩定。AK黨在六月和十一月之間的民調的迅速回復，反映出他們對於回到政治動盪的恐懼，就如同他們對於該黨主導下的政治的熱情。

The collapse last summer of peace talks between the government and the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK), an armed rebel group, raises the spectre(幽靈) of more bloodshed. The talks had made little progress but did much to calm the restless south-east, a region dominated by ethnic(少數民族) Kurds, who make up 15-20% of Turkey’s population nationwide. Fighting in the region in the 1980s and 1990s had left some 40,000 soldiers, rebels and civilians dead and displaced perhaps 1m Kurds from their homes. Soon after the June election, clashes(衝突) between security forces and Kurdish activists, which had been suspended for two years, resumed. In the months since, heavily armed police have clamped curfews(宵禁) on Kurdish towns. The clashes have left well over a hundred civilians dead, in addition to scores(二十個) of Turkish security men and, says the Turkish army, more than 400 alleged PKK guerrillas(游擊隊員).

去年六月，政府與庫爾德工人黨（PKK），一個武裝叛軍組織，之間的和平談判破裂，喚起了更多的流血事件的幽靈。這個會談取得不多的進展，但對於躁動的東南部做了許多安撫，這個區域是以庫爾德族人為主的地區，庫德族占土耳其全國人口的15-20％。在80年代和90年代，該地區的戰鬥已經造成 4萬名士兵、叛亂分子和平民死亡，並使得約100萬的庫爾德人流離失所。六月大選後不久，安全部隊和庫爾德活動份子之間，已經緩和了兩年的衝突突然爆發，全副武裝的警察在庫德城鎮內實行宵禁。這場衝突造成一百多平民，數十名土耳其安全人員和土耳其軍人，以及400多名疑似庫德游擊隊員的死亡。

At the same time Mr Erdogan faces rising economic headwinds(逆風). Between 2002 and 2007 Turkey’s GDP grew at an annual average of 6.8% and its exports tripled, but since then GDP growth has settled at around 3.5% a year and exports have remained virtually flat. Income per person, which the AK party four years ago rashly(貿然) promised would rise to $25,000 a year within a decade, is stuck at around $10,000.

在此同時，埃爾多安面臨了經濟上的逆境。 2002年至2007年土耳其的 GDP 成長率為 6.8％，出口增加了兩倍；但那之後，GDP增長約為3.5％，出口量則基本持平。四年前 AK 黨承諾在十年內讓每人平均收入上升到每年 25,000美金，然而卻是停留在10000美金。

None of this is disastrous, and Turkey’s economy is far more robust than it used to be. The trouble is that Mr Erdogan’s government has continued to behave as if the good times had kept rolling. Although the country’s chronic(長期的) current-account deficit(經常項目赤字) has narrowed lately, thanks to falling energy prices, Turkey relies heavily on foreign capital and is finding it increasingly difficult to attract money from abroad. Yet in recent years its government has shied away from reforms to boost the meagre(微薄的) domestic savings rate or promote industry, even as a consumer credit(消費信貸) binge(狂歡) and heavy infrastructure spending have crowded out(晾在一邊) private investment. Rigid labour and tax rules remain a burden. Mr Erdogan himself has shaken confidence further by bullying his central bank to keep money cheap and by hitting the business interests of political rivals. Without a serious policy shift, including an effort to deal with concerns about institutional independence and the rule of law, Turkey’s economy will continue to underperform.

這一切都不是災難性的，土耳其的經濟遠比以前更加牢靠，然而麻煩的是，埃爾多安政府仍持續表現的似乎一切都非常美好。雖然國家長期以來的經常項目赤字近來由於能源價格下跌已經縮小了，土耳其很大程度上依賴於外國資本，並發現越來越難吸引國外資金。最近幾年，政府已經不再以改革提振微薄的國內儲蓄率或是促進產業，甚至消費信貸狂潮和大型基礎支出也排擠了私人投資。僵化的勞動力和稅收規則仍是一個負擔，埃爾多安本人的信用也因為強迫央行貶值貨幣，以及打擊政敵的商業利益而搖撼。如果沒有重大的政策轉變，包括努力解決對於相關機構獨立性以及法治的隱憂，土耳其的經濟將繼續表現不佳。

Darker scenarios have less to do with the country’s domestic market than with geopolitics(地緣政治). Because of the way it straddles(跨) cultures and continents, Turkey has always held a complicated hand. In recent years the mayhem(混亂) on its southern borders, coupled with renewed tension pitting its NATO and European allies against an expansionist(領土擴張主義者) Russia, have made its position all the more delicate. Yet Mr Erdogan’s government has failed to show much diplomatic finesse.

更糟的情況起因於該國的地緣政治。由於領土跨越文化和大陸，土耳其的統治一直相當複雜。近年來南部邊界的動亂，加上反對俄羅斯領土擴張的北約和歐洲盟國之間的關係出現孔隙，使得他的地位更加微妙。不過，埃爾多安政府沒有展現出太多外交技巧。

Everyone agrees that Turkey has been immensely generous in accommodating well over 2m refugees from Syria’s civil war. It has also worked hard to resolve long-standing squabbles(爭論) with neighbours such as Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Armenia. But it has often appeared aloof(超然) and suspicious, failing to communicate effectively or to work with allies.

大家一致認為土耳其已經在敘利亞的內戰，以及容納兩百萬難民的事情上展現了極大的寬容，它還努力解決長期存在的與鄰國之間的爭論，如希臘，保加利亞，塞浦路斯和亞美尼亞。但他的態度往往過於冷漠和多疑，缺乏與盟國的有效的溝通和合作。

The most important of these, and Turkey’s dominant trading partner, is the European Union. Fear of a continuing tidal wave of migrants has lately prompted Europe to proffer(提供) aid and a resumption of stalled(停滯的) talks on Turkish membership in exchange for tighter border controls. But there is little warmth in the relationship. Most European governments still see Turkey as a buffer more than a partner. And Mr Erdogan’s government has appeared more concerned to extract concessions(讓步) than to adopt European norms as a good thing in their own right.

最重要的一件事是，土耳其的主要貿易夥伴是歐盟。對於難民潮的恐懼促使歐洲提供援助，並重啟已經陷入僵局的談判，以換取更嚴格的邊境控制。但在這個關係中只有少許暖意，大多數歐洲國家政府仍然把土耳其視為一個緩衝而不是一個夥伴，而埃爾多安政府已經開始對讓步有顧慮，而不再把採取歐洲規範當成一件好事。

The danger of isolation was sharply underlined in November when Turkish jets shot down a Russian fighter over Syria that had briefly entered its air space. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, swiftly responded with a broadside of sanctions. The Russian measures could trim up to 0.7% from Turkish GDP growth this year, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

去年十一月，土耳其擊落了經過領空的俄羅斯的戰鬥機的事件，更凸顯了土耳其被孤立的危機。俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普京立刻實行寬邊貿易制裁。根據歐洲重建和發展銀行的說法，俄羅斯此舉可能削減土耳其當年的 GDP 成長率達0.7％。

With lukewarm(微溫的) support from its allies, Turkey has tried to calm the excitement. But given its support for militias fighting against Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, and Russia’s growing military commitment to his survival, there could well be more clashes(衝突). Turkey seems in danger of stumbling into an unplanned but potentially costly fight. It imports most of its gas from Russia, and Turkish construction firms have well over $10 billion-worth of Russian contracts on their books.

面對盟國冷淡的支持，土耳其試圖平息風浪，但由於他對於反對敘利亞總統巴沙爾·阿薩德的民兵的支持，加上俄羅斯對敘利亞方面不斷增加的軍事承諾，可能造成更多的衝突。土耳其似乎捲入了一個非計劃中的，但潛在的昂貴的戰鬥，他大部分天然氣來自俄羅斯，而土耳其建築公司與俄羅斯有超過100億美金價值的合同。

Now Turkey faces a new threat. A double suicide-bombing in Ankara on October 10th last year aimed at a march by leftist trade unions and Kurdish activists killed more than 100 people. In January suicide-bombers struck again, this time in the heart of Istanbul, killing ten tourists. Both attacks were attributed to Islamic State. In a country that has long seen itself as insulated from Middle Eastern turmoil, the intrusion(侵擾) of violent radical Islam came as a particular shock. Worse, it partly reflected Mr Erdogan’s slowness to recognise the danger of blow-back from his own policies in Syria, where Turkey for too long indulged(姑息) radical Islamists so long as they opposed the Assad regime.

現在，土耳其面臨一個新的威脅，去年10月10日發生在安卡拉的雙自殺爆炸事件，其目標是左派工會和庫爾德活動份子的遊行，造成超過100人死亡。今年一月，在伊斯坦堡的心臟地帶再度發生自殺式炸彈爆炸事件，這一次造成10 名遊客的死亡。這兩起襲擊都歸因於伊斯蘭國。伊斯蘭國一向自外於中東的動盪，這次這個來自暴力極端份子的侵擾特別令人震驚。更糟的是，這顯示出埃爾多安對於他的敘利亞政策的反應過於緩慢，土耳其由於他們反對阿薩德政權，對他們長期姑息。

Rather than blame the party in power for such setbacks(挫折), worried voters in November rallied(反彈) behind Mr Erdogan, backing a strong, tested government rather than risk rule by a possibly weaker coalition. It helped that the ruling party, in effect, controls Turkey’s mainstream media, which pumped up nationalism in the face of danger. Mr Erdogan had carried the 2014 presidential election with a slim majority of 52%, and his AK party, for all its success, enjoys the support of just half the Turkish public. Many of the rest remain sceptical or even bitterly opposed to him.

與其在這個挫折上責備執政黨，11月，擔憂的選民們在埃爾多安背後組成反對勢力，組織了一個有力的實驗性政府，取代一個由一個脆弱的聯盟社定的規則。實際上他幫助執政黨控制土耳其的主流媒體，因為主流媒體在危機時鼓吹民族主義。埃爾多安在2014年的總統大選得到了52％的支持，而他所屬的AK黨只享有一半的土耳其公眾的支持。其於的民眾仍對他抱持懷疑態度，甚至強烈反對他。

This special report will argue that Turkey’s leaders, with their ambitions still set on mastery(征服), are not doing nearly enough to heal such internal rifts(裂痕). The Kurdish issue looms(編織) as one big danger, and so does the Turkish economy’s growing vulnerability(弱點) to external shocks. Mr Erdogan’s blustering(咆嘯著), bulldozing(強迫的) style, together with his party’s growing intolerance for dissent, portends(預告) trouble.

這個特別報導將論述，這些仍然將野心放在征服上的土耳其領導人，將無法成就這些彌縫內部分裂的工作。庫爾德問題是一個極大的危機，另一個危機則是土耳其經濟在面對外來衝擊時逐漸擴大的弱點。埃爾多安狂爆和強迫式的領導風格，以及他的黨對反對聲音的心胸狹窄，預示著土耳其的將要面對的麻煩。