寄生草莓的英文俱樂部

原文出處經濟學人。

Trade in the balance

Globalisation can make everyone better off. That does not mean it will

全球化可以讓每一個人都更好，但是並不意味著它一定會這樣。

THE past two decades have left working-class voters in many countries leery(留神的，猜疑的) of globalisation. Donald Trump, the billionaire television star who promises to slap a 45% tariff(關稅) on Chinese goods if elected president of America, has partly based his candidacy(候選人資格) on this angst(擔憂). Economists tend to scoff(嘲弄) at such brash(傲慢輕率的) protectionism; they argue, rightly, that trade does far more good than harm. Yet new research reveals that for many, the short-term costs and benefits are more finely balanced than textbooks assume.

在過去的二十年裡都使得許多國家中工薪階層的選民全球化抱持懷疑的態度。億萬富翁電視明星唐納川普承諾，如果他當選美國總統，將會給中國貨物打上45％的關稅。經濟學家對於這種輕率的保護主義嗤之以鼻，他們認為，正確的說，貿易確實利大於弊。然而，新的研究表明對於很多行業而言，短期成本和收益之間的平衡都比教科書上所說的來得微妙。

David Autor of MIT, David Dorn of the University of Zurich and Gordon Hanson of the University of California, San Diego, provide convincing evidence that workers in the rich world suffered much more from the rise of China than economists thought was possible. In their most recent paper*, published in January, they write that sudden exposure to foreign competition can depress wages and employment for at least a decade.

分別來自麻省理工學院、蘇黎世大學、和加州大學聖地亞哥分校的三位教授，提供了令人信服的證據表明，富裕國家中的工人在中國的過程中所遭受的損失遠超過經濟學家的想像。在他們最近的一份論文中提到，突然面對外國的競爭可以壓低工資和就業的至少十年。

Trade is beneficial in all sorts of ways. It provides consumers with goods they could not otherwise enjoy: without it only Scots would sip lovely Islay single malts. It boosts variety: Americans can shop for Volvos and Subarus in addition to Fords. Yet its biggest boon(恩惠，福利), economists since Adam Smith have argued, is that it makes countries richer. Trade creates larger markets, which allows for greater specialisation, lower costs and higher incomes.

國際貿易在許多方式是有利：它提供消費者一些除非透過貿易否則無法享受的商品；沒有國際貿易，只有蘇格蘭人能夠品嘗可愛的艾萊單一麥芽威士忌；它提高的商品的多樣性，美國人除了福特以外，還能選擇富豪和速霸陸。然而他最大的好處則是，自亞當·史密斯以降的經濟學家認為，是它使得國家更加富裕。貿易創造了更大的市場，允許更專業的分工，更低的成本和更高的收入。

Economists have long accepted that this overall boost to prosperity might not be evenly spread. A paper published by Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson in 1941 pointed out that trade between an economy in which labour was relatively scarce (like America) and one in which labour was relatively abundant (like China) could cause wages to fall in the place that was short of workers. Yet many were sceptical(懷疑的) that such losses would crop up much in practice. Workers in industries affected by trade, they assumed, would find new jobs in other fields.

長久以來，經濟學家們早就接受了這個整體推動的繁榮可能不會均勻地分佈。由Wolfgang Stopper 和 Paul Samuelson 在 1941 年發表的一篇論文中指出，在一個勞動力相對短缺的經濟體中（如美國），與一個勞動力相對充裕的國家（如中國）之間的貿易，可能會導致勞動力短缺國家的工人的工資下降。然而，許多人懷疑，這樣的損失實際上是否會出現，他們假設，受到自由貿易影響的工人，會在其他領域找到新的就業機會。

For a long time, they appeared to be right. In the decades following the second world war, rich countries mostly traded with each other, and workers prospered. Even after emerging economies began playing a larger role in global trade, in the 1980s, most research concluded that trade’s effects on workers were benign(良性的). But China’s subsequent incorporation into the global economy was of a different magnitude. From 1991 to 2013 its share of global exports of manufactured goods rocketed from 2.3% to 18.8%. For some categories of goods in America, Chinese import penetration—the share of domestic consumption met through Chinese imports—was near total.

很長一段時間以來，他們似乎是正確的。在第二次世界大戰後的幾十年裡，富裕國家大多是相互買賣，勞工們也因此富裕，即使在新興經濟體開始在全球貿易中扮演重要角色的 80 年代，大多數的研究得出的結論，貿易對工人的影響是良性的。但中國的後續融入全球經濟時則造成不同程度的影響：從1991年至2013年，其製成品占全球出口的比例從2.3％飆升到18.8％，在美國的某些品項，中國的進口滲透幾乎是全面的。

The gain to China from this opening up has been enormous. Average real income rose from 4% of the American level in 1990 to 25% today. Hundreds of millions of Chinese have moved out of poverty thanks to trade. A recent NBER working paper suggests Americans will benefit too: over the long run trade with China is projected to raise American incomes. In parts of the economy less susceptible to competition from cheap Chinese imports, the authors argue, firms profit from a larger global market and reduced supply costs, and should also gain—eventually—from the reallocation of labour away from shrinking manufacturing to more productive industries.

這個開放的效益對中國而言是巨大的，中國的平均收入從1990年美國水平的4％ 上升到今天的25％，數以億計的中國人由於貿易得以脫離貧窮。一份最近的 NBER工作文件認為美國人也將在此事中受益，長遠來說，與中國的貿易將會提高美國的收入。在某些對中國的廉價進口產品的競爭比較不敏感的產業，作者認為，企業將得益於更大的全球市場，並得以降低成本，並且最終也將因勞工的重新分配，而從萎縮的製造業轉變成更有生產效益的工業。

But those benefits are only visible after decades. In the short run, the same study found, America’s gains from trade with China are minuscule(微不足道). The heavy costs to those dependent on industries exposed to Chinese imports offset most of the benefits to consumers and to firms in less vulnerable(弱勢的) industries. Economists’ assumption that workers would easily adjust to the upheaval(動盪) of trade seems to have been misplaced. Manufacturing activity tends to be geographically concentrated. So the disruption caused by Chinese imports was similarly concentrated, in hubs such as America’s Midwest. The competitive blow to manufacturers rippled through regional economies, write Messrs Autor, Dorn and Hanson, battering suppliers and local service industries. Such places lacked growing industries to absorb displaced workers, and the unemployed proved reluctant (or unable) to move to more prosperous regions. Labour-market adjustment to Chinese trade was thus slower and less complete than expected.

但是，這些效益要幾十年之後才會顯現，從短期來看，同樣的研究發現，美國從與中國貿易中得到的好處微乎其微的。這些沉重的代價抵消大部分給消費者和非弱勢產業中的企業。經濟學家們的假設 - 認為工人可以很容易地跟隨貿易的動盪做調整 - 似乎是放錯了地方。製造業通常集中分佈，因此，由於中國進口而受到影響的區域也相對集中，例如美國的中西部地區。競爭打擊了廠商也波及區域經濟，使得供應商和本地服務業也受到衝擊。。作者 Messrs Auto, Dorn 和 Hanson 如此說。由於缺少地方工業吸納下崗工人，而且事實證明了工人不願意（或不能）移動到較繁榮的地區，勞工市場的調整的緩慢和不完全並不如預期。

As a result, the authors found in a 2013 paper, competition from Chinese imports explains 44% of the decline in employment in manufacturing in America between 1990 and 2007. For any given industry, an increase in Chinese imports of $1,000 per worker per year led to a total reduction in annual income of about $500 per worker in the places where that industry was concentrated. The offsetting rise in government benefits was only $58 per worker. In a paper from 2014, co-written with Daron Acemoglu and Brendan Price, of MIT, and focusing on America’s “employment sag” in the 2000s, the authors calculate that Chinese import competition reduced employment across the American economy as a whole by 2.4m jobs relative to the level it otherwise would have enjoyed.

The costs of Chinese trade seem to have been exacerbated(加劇) by China’s large current-account surpluses(經常贏餘項目): China’s imports from other countries did not grow by nearly as much as its exports to other countries. China’s trade with America was especially unbalanced. Between 1992 and 2008, trade with China accounted for 20-40% of America’s massive current-account deficit; China imported many fewer goods from America than vice versa.

其結果是，在2013年論文作者發現，中國進口產品的競爭導致1990年到2007年間 44% 的就業下降，對於任何行業的44％，平均每增加 1000 美元/ 人的中國進口，就導致了 500 美金/ 人的年收入總額減少，而政府福利措施只能補助 58美金/人。在2014年與 Daron Acemoglu 和 Brendan Price 合寫的論文中，針對 2000年美國的就業下降，作者計算，中國的進口競爭造成全美國減少了兩百四十萬個就業機會，與中國貿易的成本隨著中國經常盈餘的增加而加劇，中國的進口的增加並不沒有出口增長的那麼多，中美之間的貿易則是特別不平衡。1992年至2008年，與中國的貿易佔美國的經常賬戶赤字的20-40％，相對的，中國從美國進口的貨物比出口少了許多。

Sub-Pareto
Trade generates enormous global gains in welfare. Generous trade-adjustment assistance, job retraining and other public spending that helps to build political support for trade are therefore sound investments. To make any of these policies work, however, economists and politicians must stop thinking of them as political goodies designed to buy off interest groups opposed to trade. They are essential to fulfilling trade’s promise to make everyone better off.

Sub-Pareto 貿易公司在福利上產生巨大的全球收益，貿易調整的援助、再就業培訓、以及其他為了建立貿易的而提供的政治協助，都是相當合理的投資。為了成就這些政策方面的工作，經濟學家和政治家必須改變他們將這些措施視為收買反對貿易者的措施，這些純粹是為了履行貿易"使得每一個人都更好" 的承諾。