寄生草莓的英文俱樂部

Adopted from The Economist 

ON JANUARY 19th China declared that its gross domestic product had grown by 6.9% in 2015, accounting for inflation—the slowest rate in a quarter of a century. It was neatly within the government’s target of “around 7%”, but many economists wondered whether the figure was accurate. Online chatter in China about dodgy(閃閃躲躲的) GDP numbers was fuelled a week later by the arrest of the man who had announced the data: Wang Baoan, the head of the National Bureau of Statistics. The country’s anti-graft agency(反貪機構)  accused him of “serious disciplinary violations(嚴重違紀)”, a euphemism(委婉說法) for corruption. But beyond all the (justifiable) doubts(合理懷疑) about the figures lies another important question. That is: why does China have a GDP target at all?

1月19日中國宣布其國內生產總值在 2015 年扣除通膨之後的成長率為  6.9％，這是四分之一世紀以來中國最低的成長率，雖然仍舊俐落地落在中國政府所設的“7％左右”的目標之內，但是許多經濟學家都懷疑這個數字的準確性。中國網民對於這個閃閃躲躲的 GDP 的竊竊私語，在一週之後，在宣布此一數字的國家統計局負責人王保安被逮捕後被引爆。該國的反貪機構指責為“嚴重違紀”，這個罪名基本上是貪腐收賄的委婉說法。除了對於這個 GDP 數字的合理懷疑以外，還有一個重要的問題。那就是：到底為什麼中國要設定 GDP的目標？

For a while there were signs that the leadership itself had doubts about the merits of GDP target-setting. In 2013 Xinhua, an official news agency, decried(公開譴責) what it called the country’s “GDP obsession(情結)”. By the next year, 70 or so counties and cities had scrapped their targets. In 2015 Shanghai joined them, becoming the first big city to break with orthodoxy(正統) (each level of government sets its own GDP target, often higher than the national one). Liu Qiao of the Guanghua School of Management at Peking University says the central government ought to follow suit(如法炮製).

有一段時間，有跡象表明，領導階層曾經對 GDP目標設定的好處表示懷疑。 2013年新華社，中國的官方通訊社，公開譴責中國"GDP情結”，第二年，70個左右縣市放棄了他們的目標， 2015年在上海加入其中，成為第一個背離正統的大城市（每一級政府設定自己的目標GDP，這些目標往往比國家的目標來得高）。北京大學光華管理學院的劉巧認為，中央政府應該效仿此一作法。

Last year there were hints that it might. The prime minister, Li Keqiang, said the government would not “defend [the target for 2015] to the death”. And in October, talking about the government’s work on a new five-year economic plan (which will run from 2016 to 2020), President Xi Jinping avoided mentioning a number. That raised expectations that targets might at least be downplayed(貶低), if not abandoned.

去年似乎有改變的跡象。中國總理李克強說，政府不會“為了保衛[2015年目標]而死。” 。而在十月，在談到政府的新的五年經濟計劃時（這將從2016年實行至2020年），習近平避免提及任何一個跟 DGP 有關的數字。這使得一般認為，GDP 目標即使沒有被放棄，至少也會減低其重要性。

They have not been, however. An outline of the five-year plan, unveiled in November, contained the usual emphasis on growth. And Mr Xi appeared to change his tune(改變論調), saying expansion must average at least 6.5% a year until 2020. Many economists believe that will require yet more debt-inducing stimulus. A GDP target for this year is all but certain(幾乎確定)  to be announced, as usual, at the annual session of the legislature in March (when the five-year plan will also be adopted). It will probably be higher than 6%. Speculation that the government might set a target range in order to give itself more policymaking flexibility (as the IMF and the World Bank have urged) has ebbed. In December some national legislators complained that local governments were busting their debt ceilings because there was “still too much emphasis on GDP”.

然而似乎並沒有。該五年計劃在11月推出的提綱中，包含平日對於經濟成長的重視。而習近平也開始改變論調，提出在 2020 年之前成長必須維持在每年平均至少 6.5％，很多經濟學家認為，這將會需要更多造成債務提高的刺激。今年的GDP 目標幾乎確定將如同往常在立法機關三月的年會中公布（當五年計劃也將通過），預料將可能會高於 6％。市場上曾經猜測，中國政府可能會改成設定一個目標範圍而非一個固定的數字，以便在決策時有更多的彈性（如國際貨幣基金組織和世界銀行所期望的），但此猜測已然消退。去年12月某一國家立法者抱怨說，地方政府因為過分強調 GDP 之故而破壞了他們的舉債上限。

So why is there still a target? The reasons are political. In a country so large, central leaders are always fearful of losing their grip on far-flung bureaucrats: setting GDP targets is one means by which they believe they can evaluate and control those lower down. Local officials are also judged by environmental standards, social policies and what the Communist Party calls “virtue”—that is, being uncorrupt and in tune with the party’s latest interpretation of Marxist doctrine. But GDP is usually the most important criterion, having the attraction of being (roughly) measurable.

既然如此何以還要設定 GDP 目標呢？這個原因是政治上的。在一個幅員如此遼闊的國家之中，中央領導人總是擔心對於偏遠地區的官僚失去掌握，設定GDP 目標是他們評估和控制那些較低層官僚的方式。雖然地方官員同時也受到環保標準、社會政策、以及共產黨的精神 - 廉潔和馬克思主義 - 的規範。但是，GDP通常是最重要的標竿，最有吸引力也最容易衡量。

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At higher levels, promotion is determined in part by which faction an official belongs to. But the lower down the hierarchy a government entity is, the more it is likely to be judged by GDP. When Mr Li, the prime minister, suggested that GDP targets might not be all-important, many people complained. One academic says that without such targets, local officials would not know what they are supposed to be doing. At a time when Mr Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is causing many nervous officials to sit on their hands（袖手旁觀） to avoid graft-busters（貪腐剋星）’ attention, party leaders are all the more unwilling to abandon an appraisal system which—however imperfectly—holds officials to account and can goad（鞭策） them into action.

在政府高層，官員的晉升與否取決於所屬的黨派，但在政府基層單位的晉升則是透過  GDP目標來衡量。當李總理提出GDP目標可能不是最重要的指標的建議時，反而遭致許多抱怨。一位學者說，因為如果沒有這項目標，地方官員將不知所措。當此之時，習近平的反腐敗運動使得許多緊張的官員袖手旁觀以免引起貪腐剋星的注意，黨的領導人更不願在此時放棄一個即使不完美，但仍可以鞭策官員們前進的評核制度。

These aims were first proclaimed by Jiang Zemin, who was then president, in 1997—inspired, it appeared, by Deng, who was the first to speak of a need to make China “moderately prosperous”. The paradox is that by fixating（專注注視） on growth targets China may end up badly damaging its economy, rather than fulfilling its goals.

這些目標是由當時( 1997 年) 的總理江澤民首先提出的，它的靈感是來自於鄧小平的口號，他首先提出建設中國成為“小康”的口號。弔詭的是，專注於成長目標，可能會讓中國最終造成嚴重的經濟損害，而不是達成目標。