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原文連結：Big Banks Chop Chop
BOSSES at big banks would once have cringed(畏縮) at releasing the kind of results they have been serving up to investors in recent days. This week, for instance, Deutsche Bank posted a loss of €6.8 billion ($7.4 billion) for 2015. In the third quarter of last year the average return on equity(平均資產淨收益) at the biggest banks, those with more than $1 trillion in assets, was a wan(蒼白的) 7.9%—far below the returns of 15-20% they were earning before the financial crisis. Exclude Chinese banks from the list, and the figure drops to a miserable 5.7%. Returns have been languishing(枯萎) at that level for several years.
大銀行老闆們最近幾天在發佈投資報告時可能都很猶豫，譬如本週德意志銀行公佈了2015年 68 億歐元（$ 74 億）的虧損。去年第三季擁有超過一萬億美元資產的大型銀行平均淨資產收益只有 7.9%，遠低於金融危機前的 15-20％。從列表中排除中國的銀行，這個數字下降到只有可憐的5.7％，利潤維持在這個水平已經好幾年了。
In response, the banks’ top brass (高級官員) are following a similar template(樣板): retreats from certain countries or business lines, along with a stiff dose(猛藥) of job cuts. Barclays, which earlier this month said it would eliminate 1,000 jobs at its investment bank and shut up shop altogether in Asia, is typical. More radical measures, such as breaking up their firms into smaller, more focused and less heavily regulated units, do not seem to be on the cards(很有可能發生).
對此，銀行的高層都遵循類似的樣板：一面從某些國家或業務線中退出，一面加上裁員的猛藥。典型的做法，如同巴克萊銀行在本月稍早些時候表示，將減少亞洲的分行並裁減 1000人。更激進的措施很有可能發生，比如，將公司分割成比較小、更有針對性和更少的嚴格監管的單位。
In fact, in spite of investors’ frustration at dismal returns and regulators’ insistence that banks that are “too big to fail” will be cut down to size, the world’s mightiest banks have scarcely shrunk at all since Lehman Brothers collapsed. The 11 behemoths(龐然大物) considered the most pivotal(關鍵的) by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), a global grouping of regulators, had $22 trillion in assets at the end of 2008; they now have $20 trillion. The assets of the wider group of 30 institutions the FSB describes as “global, systemically important banks” have grown, not shrunk, in recent years.
事實上，儘管投資者在獲利上的受挫，以及立法者的堅持，認為那些"大到不能倒"的銀行應該要削減規模，然而從雷曼兄弟倒閉以來，世界上最強大的銀行幾乎沒有縮水。這11個被 FSB ( 金融穩定理事會)認為最關鍵的龐然大物，在2008年底有22萬億美元的資產，而他們現今則有 20萬億美元。最近幾年，在更長的名單中，被 FSB 認為是"全球性系統性的" 的 30 個機構不僅沒有縮減，反而成長了。
On the face of it(表面上看來), this is a puzzle. To forestall(先發制人；防範未然) future crises, regulators have piled on new rules intended explicitly(明確地) to make life harder for the banks that are thought to present the greatest risks to the stability of the global financial system. All banks must meet higher capital ratios these days, funding a greater share of their activities with money put up by shareholders rather than by borrowing. This crimps(壓縮) returns but ensures a stouter(更堅固的) buffer if they run into trouble. But the extra capital requirements are especially severe for the biggest banks.
表面上看來，這是一個謎。為了防範未然，監管機構已經訂定了立意明確的法令，使得這些可能對全球金融體系穩定帶來風險的銀行生存困難，所有銀行必須滿足更高的資本比率，他們的活動資金來源應該更大部份來自於由股東而不是經由借款。此舉壓縮了報酬率，但卻提供了更堅固的緩衝捲曲的回報。然而額外的資本要求對於大銀行而言是特別嚴重。
Whereas a smaller bank might be required to hold capital equivalent to 7% of its risk-weighted assets(風險加權資產), HSBC and JPMorgan Chase, the two institutions the FSB judges to be most systemic, have to hold 2.5 percentage points more. American regulators have imposed a further surcharge on JPMorgan Chase which will push its minimum ratio to 11.5% by 2019. The intention is not just to make sure that big banks are safer, given the expense of bailing them out, but to discourage banks from getting too big in the first place.
較小的銀行可能被要求持有相當於 7% 風險加權資產的資金，匯豐銀行和摩根大通，這兩個被 FSB 評等為最為系統性的機構，必須持有的資金可能需要再高出 2.5個百分點。美國監管機構甚至加給摩根大通進一步的附加費，而將其最低比例推高到 11.5％ 。此舉目的不僅是要確保大銀行安全性，給予多一點脫困的空間，其首要目的是阻止銀行過份擴張。
Other bits of regulation also hamper big banks in particular. America has banned “proprietary trading”(自營交易) (a bank making investments with its own money, rather than on behalf of clients); Britain is “ring-fencing” the retail units of big banks to protect their assets in case of disaster in other parts of the business. And whereas regulators used not to make much fuss if the subsidiary(分公司) of a multinational bank in their country was not brimming with capital, as long as the bank as a whole was, most now require local units to be able to withstand shocks on their own. These rules have little impact on smaller banks, which tend not to sprawl across so many countries or to combine retail and investment banking.
監管單位還有其他措施防堵大銀行。美國已經禁止“自營交易”（銀行以自己的錢投資，而不是代表客戶）;英國則是圍堵大銀行的零售單位，以在其他部份發生災難時保護他們的資產。一般而言，各國監管單位都儘量不對跨國銀行的子公司過度反應，只要這些子公司沒有資金過載，通常只要求子公司能夠承擔衝擊。這些規則對規模較小的銀行影響較小，這些小型銀行並不熱中於將業務拓展到許多國家，也不熱中於合併零售和投資銀行業務。
By the same token(出於相同的觀念), small banks have not been fined quite so heavily by prosecutors in America and elsewhere. The penalties—some $260 billion and counting for big American and European banks—have fallen mainly on commercial and investment bankers who have fiddled markets. Some banks have regulatory staff sitting in on most meetings, even at board level. “For every maker there are four checkers these days,” grumbles one investment banker.
同樣的觀念之下，小型銀行還沒有被美國以及其他國家的檢察官的做過如此嚴重的罰款。這些對於美國和歐洲大銀行高達$2600 億的罰款，主要針對玩弄市場的商業和投資銀行家身上。一些銀行有常駐監管人員參與大部份會議，甚至董事級的會議。 “最近，一個決策者就需要搭配四個檢查者。”一位投資銀行家抱怨道。
Such changes have had some impact. Although the 11 banks that most perturb(使煩惱不安) the FSB have not really shrunk, they have at least stopped growing. There has been a marked change since the pre-crisis period. In 1990 the world’s ten biggest banks had just $3.6 trillion of assets ($6.6 trillion in today’s prices)—equivalent to 16% of global GDP. By 2008 they had assets of $25 trillion (40% of global GDP). They now have assets of $26 trillion, or 35% of global GDP.
這樣的變化造成了一定的影響。雖然帶給 FSB 困擾最大的11家銀行還沒有真正縮水，他們至少停止變大，自危機前已有了顯著變化。 1990年全球十大銀行擁有約 3.6 萬億美元的資產，相當於全球 GDP 的16％；到2008年他們的資產是25萬億美元$（全球GDP的40％）的資產。而他們現在有260000億美元，相當於全球GDP的35％的資產。
The geographical spread of the two “global” banks, HSBC and Citi, has shrunk markedly as they have left many countries. Many investment banks, particularly in Europe, have retrenched(緊縮開支) to areas of particular strength: UBS has largely abandoned the trading of bonds, currencies and commodities, for example. In general, banks are shifting away from risky and so capital-intensive(資本密集) activities, such as trading financial instruments(交易型金融工具), towards safer areas such as helping firms raise capital and managing the money of wealthy investors.
兩個“全球性”銀行 - 匯豐銀行和花旗集團的地理分佈也明顯縮水，因為他們已經離開了許多國家。許多投資銀行，特別是在歐洲，已經對某些特定區域緊縮開支：瑞銀已大幅度放棄了債券、貨幣和商品交易。一般銀行也從高風險以及資本密集型活動中轉出，如交易型金融工具，轉向更加安全的領域，例如幫助公司籌集資金和管理投資者的投資。
Some of the titans(巨人) have been more radical. Once the largest bank in the world by assets, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) has shrunk by more than half under its new majority owner, the British government. General Electric, once a bank-within-a-firm, shed most of its financial assets over the course of the past year. Credit Suisse is mulling(深思熟慮) spinning off its domestic retail bank; Deutsche Bank is selling Postbank, a big retail-banking unit in Germany.
一些巨頭已經有更激進的做法，世界上資產規模最大的銀行 - 蘇格蘭皇家銀行（RBS）- 在新的大股東英國政府主導下縮小了一半以上的規模，曾經是企業中的銀行的通用電氣在過去一年之中脫手大部分金融資產，瑞士信貸銀行正在考慮將其國內零售銀行獨立出去，德意志銀行出售了旗下一家大型零售銀行 -郵政銀行。
Yet big banks could still go much further. Many of them currently trade below book value(帳面價值), suggesting that they would be more valuable broken up. Richard Ramsden, an analyst at Goldman Sachs, suggested last year that JPMorgan Chase should be split into four units. MetLife, a big American insurer, is splitting itself up in part to reduce its capital requirements and thus boost profits. There is a “gravitational pull” towards being smaller, says the boss of one bank high up the FSB’s list. Competing with non-systemic banks, which have a lower capital ratio, is hard. “If you have a unit competing head-on against a bank that isn’t [systemically important]…that unit is worth more outside than inside.”
然而，大銀行仍然可以走得更遠，他們中的許多目前的實際交易低於賬面價值的，意味著他們將可成為更有價值的分割。高盛的分析師理查德·拉姆斯登去年提出建議，摩根大通應該分為四個單元。大都會人壽，美國一家大的保險公司，正在進行分割以減少資本要求並提高利潤。有一個“引力”邁向更小，一家名列 FSB 的銀行老闆說道，這似乎是一種讓銀行規模變小的引力。與資本比率較低的非系統性銀行競爭是很困難的。 “如果你有一個單位的與非系統重要性的銀行正面交鋒，...把那個單位獨立出去將比放在內部更有價值。”
Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase’s boss, claims that having all its units under one roof brings $18 billion a year in synergies. Such claims are basically unverifiable, but researchers have long struggled to find much in the way of economies of scale(規模經濟) in finance. Costs tend to rise roughly at the same clip as revenues. Some studies posit(設想) that savings peter(逐漸衰退) out above $50 billion in assets—a tiny fraction of the trillions held by really big banks. Others see benefits continuing further up the scale, though these are relatively small. But heft(份量) could also carry costs. The creaking(吱吱作響的) IT systems of big banks, some of which run code adapted from the 1950s, certainly suggest that. Smaller banks, let alone “fintech” upstarts(新貴), can adapt faster.
傑米·戴蒙，摩根大通的老闆，聲稱把各單位放在同一個屋簷底下的協同效應可以帶來了每年$180 億。這個說法基本上是無法證實的，但研究人員早就在努力尋找在金融規模經濟的形式。成本通常隨著收益上升，一些研究認為，儲蓄在資產中會逐漸衰退超過 500 億，這個數字對於持有萬億的大銀行可以說是九牛一毛。其他部份隨著規模持續成長，儘管這些都是比較小的。當然，規模(分量)也可以增加(攜帶)成本。大銀行老舊的(吱吱作響的)IT系統，其中一些仍然使用改編自20世紀50年代的程序編碼，當然會因為規模成長而增加成本。而規模較小的銀行則能適應較快。
Big banks can borrow more cheaply than smaller ones. In part(某種程度上), that is because they are typically more diversified(多元化) than smaller banks. But investors have also lent more cheaply to big banks on the assumption(基於這個假設) that they will get bailed out in case of trouble. New rules should make it easier to force banks’ creditors(債權人), rather than taxpayers, to foot the bill(買單) if a bank fails. This has undoubtedly shrunk the subsidy(補貼)—but not eliminated it. An IMF study from 2014, for instance, found that it still amounted to a discount of a quarter of a percentage point on their borrowing in quiet times(平安無事的時期), and potentially more during times of crisis(危機時期).
大銀行可以得到"比較便宜"的借款，在某種程度上，這是因為他們通常比小銀行更加多元化。但相對的，投資者等於是以比較便宜的"價格"把錢借給大銀行，這是基於假設在遇到狀況時他們比較能夠得到保障。新的規則應該更容易規定當銀行倒閉時，由銀行的債權人而不是納稅人買單。如此一來等於是把補貼減少了，但並非完全消除。
Even so, there is no correlation between size and returns. The most profitable banks appear to be the middling ones, with assets of between $50 billion and $1 trillion. Bigger and smaller ones are markedly less profitable (see chart).
即便如此，規模和收益率之間似乎並沒有相關性。最賺錢的銀行的資產大約是在500 億$和 10000 億之間的中等規模，更大和更小的有明顯的利潤減少（見圖表）。
So if regulators want them to shrink and decent returns are hard to come by, what is holding the big banks together? The risks and costs of breaking up a large bank are one consideration in favour of the status quo(現狀). As the boss of another systemic bank puts it: “Breaking up would be a gamble, and we are not paid to gamble.” Byzantine behind-the-scenes(幕後的) plumbing would prove a nightmare to disentangle(解開). That gives regulators pause as well as bankers.
因此，監管者希望銀行能夠縮小是困難的，這主要取決於，是什麼因素使得銀行變大？以現狀而言，將大銀行分割的風險和成本是一個考慮因素。如同另一個系統性銀行的老闆所說：“分手會是一場賭博，而客戶並不是付錢讓我們來賭博的。”拜占庭背後的管道是一場夢靨。" 這是給監管部門和銀行家的一個警訊。
In all industries, not just banking, few bosses enjoy the prospect of slimming the empires they have built. Banks are both very complex and highly regulated: that puts off activist shareholders. Bondholders, who put up much of the money big banks use to buy assets, may also be reluctant, having contracted a debt against a diversified set of banking businesses rather than just one fragment of it. Tax can be a factor: banks that made large losses in the downturn can still write them off(註銷) against today’s profits, in a way that might be compromised by a break-up. This argument once blunted(使遲鈍) calls for Citi to be dismembered(支解). The clearing mechanisms(清算機制) that exist in other markets are jammed in banking: small banks are put off making big acquisitions(收購) by capital charges(資本支出).
對於所有產業，不僅限於銀行業，只有少數幾個老闆享受到給他們所建立的帝國減肥所帶來的繁榮。銀行都非常複雜和高度規律化，這可以讓一些激進的股東自動退出。把大把鈔票放在銀行的債券持有人，可能也不願意將原本多樣性的債券限縮到僅有一個區塊。稅可能會是一個動機，獲利時的利潤可能因為稅的關係在經濟低迷時被沖銷，將銀行分割可能折衷這個問題，這種說法一度使得對於花旗銀行分割的呼籲沒有那麼尖銳。存在於其他市場的清算機制在銀行業似乎行不通：小銀行因為資本支出而推遲大型收購案。
All the same, shareholders are growing impatient. Bosses seen as too timid(膽小羞怯) are being sent packing. Anshu Jain, who built up Deutsche Bank’s investment bank over 20 years, was removed as co-chief executive in June after moving too slowly to overhaul(檢修) his creation. His successor, John Cryan, an avowed(公開宣示) cost-cutter, has warned staff of the need for “a fair balance between staff and shareholder interests”. That means less for staff and more for shareholders, reversing a decades-long trend (see chart 2). The big banks may not have changed shape radically since the crisis. But that doesn’t mean life is fun.
儘管如此，股東越來越不耐煩。被視為太膽小老闆被趕跑了。建立了德意志投資銀行超過 20 年的耆那教安舒，因為太慢整頓而在六月被從聯合首席執行官職位上拔除。他的繼任者約翰·Cryan，宣示要降低成本，卻被警告說，需要顧及"工作人員和股東之間的利益平衡”，意即這意味著給員工較少的利益，給股東更多的利益，扭轉了長達數十年的趨勢（見圖表2）。大銀行可能沒有因為金融危機徹底改變型態，但這並不意味著生活充滿樂趣。
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